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ABOUT THIS EVENT 
The Center for Stabilization and Reconstruction Studies hosted a short 
course on Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) from 
March 30 — April 2, 2008. The event was co-sponsored by the International 
Organization for Migration, Save the Children, and The Initiative for Inclusive 
Security. Forty-fi ve participants from nongovernmental organizations, 
intergovernmental organizations, government civilian agencies, and the 
armed forces met to review best practices and lessons identifi ed from 
past DDR programs. Particular emphasis was placed on areas in which past 
programs have demonstrated the most shortcomings: the reintegration phase 
and the inclusion of women, children, and youth in DDR.
The Center for Stabilization and Reconstruction Studies (CSRS) is a 
teaching institute which develops and hosts educational programs for 
stabilization and reconstruction practitioners operating around the 
globe. Established by the Naval Postgraduate School in 2004 through 
the vision and congressional support of Congressman Sam Farr 
(CA-17), CSRS creates a wide array of programs to foster dialogue among practitioners, 
as well as help them develop new strategies and refi ne best practices to improve the 
effectiveness of their important global work.
Located at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California, CSRS also contributes 
to the university’s research and graduate degree programs. For more information about 
CSRS, its philosophy, and programs, please visit www.nps.edu/csrs. 
The International Organization for Migration works to help ensure 
the orderly and humane management of migration, to promote 
international cooperation on migration issues, to assist in the 
search for practical solutions to migration problems and to provide 
humanitarian assistance to migrants in need, be they refugees, displaced persons or 
other uprooted people such as former combatants.
Save the Children is the leading independent 
organization creating lasting change in the lives 
of children in need in the United States and 
around the world. Recognized for our commitment to accountability, innovation, 
and collaboration, our work takes us into the heart of communities, where we help 
children and families help themselves.
The Initiative for Inclusive Security, including The 
Women Waging Peace Network, advocates for the full 
participation of all stakeholders, especially women, in 
peace processes. Creating sustainable peace is achieved 
best by a diverse, citizen-driven approach. Of the many 
sectors of society currently excluded from peace processes, none is larger or more 
critical to success than women. Through its publications, partnerships, and trainings, 
The Initiative supports the Women Waging Peace Network, which includes more than 800 
women peacebuilders around the globe, and connects members with policy shapers to 
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programs have fallen 
short of desired goals, 
practitioners are 
working together to 
develop innovative 
approaches to create 
a more inclusive, 
sustainable DDR process.
Pictured from left to right: Kees 
Steenken, Swedish Defence College; 
Sophie da Câmara, Bureau for Crisis 
Prevention and Recovery, United 
Nations Development Programme; Lejla 
Mavris, Global Majority; and Muwonge 
Maxie Joseph, Jamii Ya Kupatanisha.
In the transition from war to peace, 
one of the most emblematic steps is 
the disarmament and demobilization 
(D&D) of armed groups with the 
hope that their members will 
be reintegrated into society as 
productive citizens. A successful 
D&D process helps build confi dence 
in the peace process and is a key 
ingredient for short-term security 
and stability; reintegration, as part 
of a broader process of economic 
reconstruction, is important for 
longer-term stability, security, 
and prosperity. Unfortunately, 
disarmament, demobilization, 
and reintegration (DDR) programs 
often fall short of their goals 
because of their intensive focus 
on the processing of adult male 
ex-combatants to the detriment of 
female combatants, child soldiers, 
support personnel, and combatants’ 
families. At the same time, 
reintegration has often failed for a 
variety of reasons: lack of funding; 
inadequate implementation (canned 
vocational training programs that 
often ignore economic realities); and 
narrow conceptualization (a focus 
on short-term material assistance 
to individuals which neglects the 
communities that are essential for 
social and economic reintegration). 
In response to these and other 
shortcomings, agencies and groups 
involved in DDR have engaged in 
a fruitful process of innovation on 
the ground and refl ection on best 
practices to produce an emerging 
consensus on the components 
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A successful D&D process helps build 
conﬁ dence in the peace process 
and is a key ingredient for short-term 
security and stability. ”
“
2necessary for an inclusive and 
sustainable process of DDR.1 
To disseminate and more fully 
consider these fi ndings, the 
Center for Stabilization and 
Reconstruction Studies, located in 
Monterey, California, hosted a short 
course entitled “Disarmament, 
Demobilization, and Reintegration” 
from March 30 — April 2, 2008. 
The event was cosponsored by 
the International Organization 
for Migration, Save the Children, 
and The Initiative for Inclusive 
Security. Forty-fi ve participants from 
nongovernmental organizations, 
intergovernmental organizations, 
government civilian agencies, and the 
armed forces met to review best 
practices and lessons identifi ed 
from past DDR programs as well 
as to identify areas in which 
challenges remain. 
Part I of this report focuses on best 
practices and lessons identifi ed from 
D&D processes. Part II discusses 
the challenges confronting those 
attempting to devise successful 
reintegration strategies and 
describes the ongoing efforts of the 
international community to respond 
to those challenges. Part III reviews 
the basic principles of a more 
inclusive approach to DDR that takes 
into account the special needs of 
often marginalized groups: women, 
children, and youth. The importance 
of addressing gender issues and 
including women’s groups at all phases 
of the DDR process is also stressed. 
Part IV concludes by highlighting the 
guiding principles of DDR — such as 
the need for consultation, context-
specifi c approaches, and capacity 
building — that were stressed 
throughout the workshop.••
The DDR event brought together 
45 working practitioners to review 
best practices and identify current 
challenges to implementing 
successful programs. ”
“
At right: Lieutenant Colonel Apollinaire 
Ndayimirije, National Police Force, 
Government of Burundi, greets a fellow 
workshop participant as Gloria Jean 
Garland, Offi ce of Democracy and 
Governance, US Agency for International 
Development, looks on.
Disarmament and 
demobilization is a 
politically sensitive, 
logistically challenging 
task. However, it is a 
necessary early step on 
the road from war to 
peace. As a consequence, 
it is important to design 
and implement initiatives 
that refl ect realities 
on the ground and will 
withstand the pressures 
of the transition from 
war to peace.
After the signing of a peace 
agreement, one of the fi rst actions 
undertaken is the disarmament 
and demobilization of the warring 
parties, usually in accord with 
provisions negotiated during the 
peace talks. These necessary and 
symbolically important fi rst steps 
on the road from war to peace 
— the destruction of weapons, 
the doffi ng of military garb — play 
an important, but limited, role 
in the overall stabilization and 
reconstruction process. DDR 
experts were quick to note that 
no matter how well planned, a 
D&D process cannot succeed in the 
absence of political will. At the 
same time, even a well-executed 
D&D process is less important for 
its own accomplishments than for 
laying the necessary groundwork 
for reintegration. Should the latter 
fail, any successes of the D&D 
process will be ephemeral. The guns 
removed from circulation during 
the disarmament and dissolution 
of command structures during 
demobilization contribute little on 
their own to preventing confl ict in 
the long run — new weapons can 
readily be obtained and fi ghters 
remobilized. Instead, success 
ultimately depends on a process 
of reintegration that removes the 
reasons for using guns. 
Having said that, a poorly planned 
and executed D&D process can 
jeopardize peace, undermining 
the delicate fabric of confi dences 
stitched together during peace 
talks. The volatility of the situation 
on the ground in the immediate 
aftermath of confl ict, as well as the 
logistical challenges of processing 
thousands of individuals, render 
disarmament and demobilization 
a process fraught with potential 
diffi culties. The best practices 
and lessons learned presented in 
this section represent the efforts 
of practitioners to undertake an 
administratively complex task in 
a politically explosive and quickly 
changing environment. As a 
result, many of the best practices 
evince a “do no harm” approach 
— don’t create stockpiles that 
can be exploited, don’t offer cash 
payments that will cause an infl ux 
of arms, don’t keep combatants 
at cantonment sites for extended 
periods, don’t provide cash 
resources that reinforce command 
structures, don’t create excessive 
expectations, don’t rush in without 
adequate planning — that is 
sometimes more easily articulated 
than observed. 
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Many successful D&D best practices evince 
a “do no harm” approach — don’t create 
stockpiles, don’t offer cash for guns, don’t keep 
combatants at cantonment sites long-term, don’t 
create excessive expectations, don’t rush in 
without adequate planning — that is more easily 
articulated than observed. ”
“
4Disarmament 
Disarmament is the collection, 
documentation, control and 
disposal of small arms, ammunition, 
explosives and light and heavy 
weapons of combatants and often 
also of the civilian population. 
Disarmament also includes the 
development of responsible arms 
management programmes. (United 
Nations Secretary-General, note to 
the General Assembly, A/C.5/59/31, 
May 2005.)
Politically, disarmament is the most 
sensitive part of the DDR process with 
the warring parties often negotiating 
many of its terms during the peace 
process and writing them into the 
Comprehensive Peace Agreement. 
Given this, the ultimate success or 
failure of disarmament depends on 
the willingness of warring parties 
to lay down their arms. While a 
disarmament program cannot create 
this political will, it is often one of 
the fi rst measures undertaken during 
the stabilization process and has a 
good deal of symbolic signifi cance 
as weapons are crushed by heavy 
machinery or offered up in bonfi res. 
A well-run program can help build 
confi dence among the warring parties 
(and the broader community) that 
the terms of the Comprehensive 
Peace Agreement will be respected. 
Conversely, a poorly run program can 
jeopardize the peace process.
In addition to building confi dence, 
disarmament can contribute to 
short-term stability and security by 
sopping up a portion of the surplus 
weaponry fl oating around in society. A 
number of the workshop participants 
noted that groups often withheld 
the best weapons and maintained 
arms caches, suggesting that lack 
of weaponry would not be a major 
factor — certainly not in the medium 
run — for explaining stability. From 
this perspective, the main purpose 
of disarmament is to contribute to 
the short-term security and stability 
necessary for reintegration and 
reconstruction efforts to take hold 
— and reduce the need for guns in 
the long run. 
Pictured at right: Simon Yazgi, Offi ce of 
Rule of Law and Security, United Nations 
Department of Peacekeeping Operations.
Given time limitations, the workshop 
discussion of disarmament was limited 
to a few critical elements that were 
controversial or problematic from the 
perspective of civilian DDR experts. 
The Need for Early Planning 
Versus Speedy Execution
Disarmament and demobilization 
are logistically challenging tasks 
undertaken amidst great uncertainty 
and serious information gaps. Not 
surprisingly, then, workshop experts 
stressed the need for an adequate 
period of early planning and 
information gathering. At the same 
time, disarmament and demobilization 
is often one of the fi rst “deliverables” 
of the peace process or peacekeeping 
team in any country and there is 
an urgency to demonstrate results 
quickly — for reasons both noble 
(e.g., the need to build confi dence) 
and expedient (e.g., a desire to 
speed the mission along and keep 
costs down). Too often, political and 
symbolic considerations trump the 
“administrative” need for planning 
and preparation, with predictable 
consequences that range from 
aborted disarmament processes to 
long waits at cantonment sites to 
reintegration programs that are based 
on assumptions rather than planning. 
In Liberia, for example, the UN 
mission was stood up in seven days, 
instead of the usual four months, and 
a DDR program was hurriedly put into 
place two months later. The process 
had to be aborted after only ten days 
and resumed again a few months 
later after the proper planning had 
been conducted.
No Weapons Buy Back
The United Nations (UN) is adamant 
in emphasizing that disarmament 
should not be presented as a 
weapons buy-back program. Such 
programs fuel the market for arms, 
generating infl ows from neighboring 
countries and driving prices down; 
this allows participants to pocket 
a portion of the payment and use 
the remainder to replace forfeited 
weapons and potentially upgrade 
them. Most workshop participants 
emphasized that if material 
incentives are the primary motive 
of those who disarm, DDR is likely 
to fail. In other words, there must 
be a certain “political will” among 
the rank and fi le as well as the elite; 
weariness with war is necessary to 
open them to the new possibilities 
that civilian life might offer. As one 
expert noted, “$150 to $300 just 
isn’t going to do it.” 
Despite this emphasis on not paying 
for disarmament, international 
organizations acknowledge that 
individual combatants require some 
compensation for turning in their 
weapons. In order to avoid the 
appearance and negative effects 
of a buy-back program, the sum 
offered is typically small ($150 to 
$300) and is usually not given to 
the individual at the time of the 
submission of a weapon but rather 
is paid in installments as part of a 
reinsertion package (the monetary 
and in-kind short-term aid provided 
to help the individual settle into 
civilian life). The fi rst installment 
is paid after the participant 
submits to a multi-day processing 
period culminating in his or her 
demobilization. The fi nal payments 
may be distributed over the span 
of several months and are often 
delivered to ex-combatants once 
they have been relocated to their 
ultimate place of settlement. 
Managing Expectations
It is important, however, that the 
payment schedule is made clear to 
recipients during public awareness 
campaigns promoting disarmament 
and demobilization. In the case of 
Liberia, the DDR program advertised 
a payment of $300 for participation 
in the D&D process. Two days of riots 
ensued when combatants arrived 
and found that they would only 
receive $150 at the end of the initial 
5
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A breakout group discusses state-of-the-art 
approaches to DDR that include historically 
underrepresented groups.
 
6processing period and would receive 
the remaining money in the form of 
two additional payments spaced out 
across several months. 
More broadly, workshop participants 
stressed the importance of managing 
expectations during the DDR process. 
Implementers should be careful 
not to oversell the program in an 
effort to generate participation. 
Instead, in an information- and 
resource-scarce environment, it 
is important to provide clear and 
detailed information about what the 
DDR process can offer and what is 
expected of participants.
The Need for Ongoing Efforts
Disarmament is an ongoing process 
that does not end with the last batch 
of surrendered weapons offered 
up in a symbolic bonfi re. Inter 
alia, advocates of small arms and 
light weapons control must devise 
legislative frameworks appropriate 
for regulating the supply of weapons 
in accordance with country-specifi c 
norms of gun ownership; establish 
the registration and tracking of legal 
weaponry; and set up enforcement 
mechanisms and information 
campaigns to make the terms of new 
regulations widely known. Given 
the regional dimension of most 
illicit arms markets, coordination 
with neighboring countries and 
regional organizations in both the 
formulation and implementation 
At right: Muwonge Maxie Joseph has written 
and worked on DDR issues extensively. 
The information- and resource-scare 
environment of the DDR process 
requires that practitioners manage the 
expectations of participants and local 
communities carefully. ”
“
7of control regimes is essential. 
Weapons-for-development programs 
hold out the promise of defusing 
tensions in areas where guns are 
growing dangerously plentiful 
by reducing the gun supply and 
addressing root causes while 
avoiding the problems of individual 
buy-back schemes. Public relations 
campaigns challenging the notion of 
gun ownership as a sign of manhood 
may also be necessary to change 




Demobilization is the formal 
and controlled discharge 
of active combatants from 
armed forces or other armed 
groups. The fi rst stage of 
demobilization may extend from 
the processing of individual 
combatants in temporary 
centres to the massing of troops 
in camps designated for this 
purpose (cantonment sites, 
encampments, assembly areas 
or barracks). The second stage 
of demobilization encompasses 
the support package provided 
to the demobilized, which is 
called reinsertion… [R]einsertion 
is short-term material and/or 
fi nancial assistance to meet 
immediate needs, and can last up 
to one year. (Secretary-General, 
note to the General Assembly, 
A/C.5/59/31, May 2005).
Demobilization, like disarmament, 
is a politically sensitive issue. 
Ideally, most of the controversial 
details, down to the location and 
accessibility of the demobilization 
sites, are worked out during the 
peace process.2 While disarmament 
is carried out by the military 
with civilian support, civilians 
assume center stage during the 
demobilization process, with support 
from the military. This shift in roles 
is appropriate, as the main focus 
of this phase is facilitating the 
transformation of participants from 
soldiers to civilians. 
After 15 years of experience 
with demobilization, the DDR 
community has overwhelmingly 
come to accept the need for an 
inclusive process that encompasses 
all members of armed groups and 
not just combatants. However, 
debates still persist over the use of 
static or mobile sites and how best 
to administer reinsertion assistance 
(though in practice the trade-
offs seem to be not as stark as in 
theory). In addition, while a goal 
of DDR programs is to contribute to 
the dismantling of military command 
structures, it is unclear whether 
they meet this objective. Finally, 
there is widespread agreement 
on the need to be flexible in the 
design and implementation of 
programs but this principle seems to 
be more easily stated than followed. 
These points are discussed in the 
following sections.
Eligibility Criteria and 
Screening: The Need 
for Inclusiveness
Identifying who belongs to an 
armed group and thus is eligible for 
demobilization and reintegration 
can be a challenging process. Once 
accepted criteria are now widely 
repudiated: Neither the possession 
of a weapon nor a list of members 
provided by commanding offi cers can 
be the sole or even primary criteria. 
Eligibility based on weapons excludes 
those who served in non-combat roles 
(e.g., porters, spies, cooks). It may 
also exclude women and children 
combatants, who are vulnerable 
to efforts by their commanders to 
manipulate the process in their own 
favor (for example, taking guns from 
combatants and giving them to family 
members to turn in so they can benefi t 
from the DDR program). Lists provided 
At right: Sophie da Câmara offers her 
insights into how to design and implement 
successful DDR programs. 
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by commanding offi cers are subject 
to similar manipulation, marginalizing 
female and child soldiers (sometimes 
out of fear of legal consequences), 
and also tend not to include those who 
play support roles (a category which 
includes some men, but tends to be 
overwhelmingly populated by children 
and women). 
In response, DDR programs have 
adopted wider criteria for eligibility: 
membership in a group. The screening 
process at the camps examines 
the validity of individual claims to 
membership, usually by asking a series 
of questions about the organization 
or past battles. In theory, extensive 
interviewing and the triangulation 
of information should prevent all 
but the most well-prepared efforts 
to gain false entry into the process. 
In practice, screening and vetting 
is a challenging art form: It is not 
unusual for 12 people to process 1,200 
individuals a day, As a consequence, 
DDR implementers are forced to make 
split-second decisions on who qualifi es 
and in what category (as adult or 
child). As a subsequent section shows, 
this is a signifi cant decision since child 
DDR programs differ in important ways 
from those for adults. 
Mobile Versus Static Sites
Demobilization may take place at 
mobile sites or larger, semi-permanent 
camps called cantonment sites. The 
use of cantonment sites has come 
under heavy criticism in the academic 
and policy literature on DDR, in part 
because of cases where troops have 
stayed in the camps for up to two 
years awaiting demobilization and 
reinsertion. Critics also stress the 
dangers of concentrating combatants 
in one area, where boredom and 
frustration can lead to riots and 
the power of commanders may be 
reinforced. In addition, they argue 
that mobile sites are more effective 
for armed groups that are not 
organized as traditional armies but 
consist instead of more decentralized 
militias whose members may have 
already returned to their communities 
with the signing of peace accords.3
While stressing the need to keep 
time in cantonment sites as short as 
possible (one week to a month), most 
experienced UN personnel at the 
workshop expressed a preference for 
static rather than mobile sites.4 The 
cantonment sites provide the space 
and time for a variety of essential 
functions to be performed: a thorough 
interviewing process to collect 
data and socioeconomic profi les 
needed for planning future phases of 
DDR; the provision of information, 
counseling and referral services, 
health screening, and pre-discharge 
awareness raising and sensitization 
to demobilizing combatants; and 
an overall processing period that is 
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It is not unusual for 12 DDR 
implementers to process 1,200 
individuals a day. As a consequence, 
they often are forced to make split-
second decisions on who qualiﬁ es for 
aid and in what category, as either an 
adult or a child.”
“
Pictured from left to right: Major Jack 
Aalborg, US Air Force and Naval 
Postgraduate School; Tom Peterman, 
Asia-Pacifi c Center for Security Studies; 
Major Scott Weston, US Air Force and 
Naval Postgraduate School; and Major 
Igor Talcan, Army of Moldova and Naval 
Postgraduate School.
long enough to signify a real divide 
between military and civilian lives, 
culminating in symbolically important 
demobilization ceremonies. 
Many of the potential shortcomings of 
cantonment can be averted or at least 
ameliorated through careful 
planning. To keep stays short, 
cantonment should not begin before 
demobilization and reinsertion 
programs are ready. The dangers 
posed by group living can be reduced 
by focusing on security and camp 
organization (e.g., separating men, 
women, and child soldiers from 
one another). It is also important 
to negotiate the location of 
cantonment sites with the surrounding 
communities. These sites are often 
in place for six months at a time, 
processing a thousand ex-combatants 
a month and creating constant roving 
bands of men who pose security 
risks and generate a demand for 
prostitution that is often fulfi lled by 
village girls. Negotiations with men 
and women community leaders to 
devise ways to reduce these risks 
and to compensate the community 
for the inevitable problems that will 
arise should be priorities for those 
charged with implementing successful 
D&D programs.
Reinsertion
Upon demobilization, ex-combatants 
are provided with reinsertion packages 
— usually a bucket of supplies and a 
sum of money — to help provide for 
their short-term material needs as 
they are transported to the locations 
where they will settle. There is 
widespread agreement that these 
payments should be designed in a way 
that will minimize resentment in the 
general population. Such resentment 
may inhibit the reintegration of 
ex-combatants or even provoke 
instability. As a result, payments 
should show relative equity with 
what other war-affected groups are 
receiving. Labor-intensive quick 
impact projects, such as those in 
which ex-combatants are employed 
alongside others to rebuild community 
infrastructure, were widely regarded 
as an appropriate way to provide 
for ex-combatants as they await 
reintegration assistance while at the 
same time providing communities with 
a “peace dividend.”
There is less agreement over whether 
reinsertion payments should be 
provided in kind or in cash and, 
if the latter, whether the money 
should be provided in a lump sum 
or installments.5 Many argue that 
installment payments can help reduce 
the chance that the money will be 
diverted away from the intended 
recipient. For example, lump-sum 
cash payments in Afghanistan were 
turned over to militia leaders, serving 
only to reinforce and enrich the very 
command-and-control structures 
that DDR was intended to dissolve. 
On the other hand, lump sum 
payments can permit investment in 
microenterprises that would not be 
feasible with installments (or in-
kind provisions). To a large extent, 
the answer will depend on context-
specifi c factors, such as the state of 
the banking system and the recipient 
(e.g., women’s preferences often 
diverge from those of men. Children 
are more vulnerable to manipulation 
and should not receive cash). 
Breaking Old Ties?
Ideally, demobilization should 
contribute to the disarticulation of 
the command and control structures 
responsible for perpetuating violent 
confl ict. For the most part, however, 
DDR experts felt that the terms of 
the peace agreement (and successful 
reintegration) were primarily 
responsible for shaping success on this 
front rather than the demobilization 
process per se. Despite this, workshop 
participants did stress the importance 
of analyzing command structures, 
as a way to validate membership 
and to hone in on the expectations 
of participants to shape programs 
accordingly. Mid-level commanders, 
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At right: Lieutenant Commander Sarah 
Dachos, US Navy and Naval Postgraduate 
School, discuss the challenges of processing 
combatants and determining who should 
get aid with Rafael Khusnutdinov, Offi ce of 
Security, Save the Children.
who are usually ignored in the peace 
agreements, should be provided 
different packages than rank-and-
fi le soldiers to encourage their 
demobilization. These actors require 
special attention as they often have 
the skills and resources that make 
them the critical link in remobilizing 
militarily — or, just as dangerously, 
in articulating criminal enterprises 
that can threaten post-confl ict 
societies. Participants also stressed 
the need to ensure that elements 
of the demobilization process — for 
example, cash payments and the setup 
of cantonment sites — do not reinforce 
the power of leaders. 
The Need for “Flexibility”
One of the guiding principles of the 
UN DDR program is that it should 
be “fl exible” — a point that was 
repeatedly stressed by DDR experts at 
the workshop. “Flexibility” has two 
components. First, the best practices 
from the IDDRS should be adapted 
“to suit the country or region in 
which they are being implemented.”6  
Experts with more than fi fteen years 
of experience implementing DDR in 
multiple countries emphasized that 
what works in one country will not 
necessarily work in another. As one 
participant put it, “We know what 
needs to be done, but the challenge 
is how to do it.” In the case of 
Liberia, for example, experts with 
experience in Sierra Leone and other 
neighboring countries recommended 
measures that failed in the Liberian 
context. Consulting local groups, 
including women-led organizations, 
to ascertain the workability of 
proposed solutions is essential. 
Second, DDR planners should 
be prepared to adapt and 
respond to “highly volatile situations 
and unexpected circumstances.” 7  
Workshop participants made 
this point repeatedly: “It’s the 
plan which adapts to reality, not 
reality to the plan.” In one case, 
demobilizing combatants assumed 
that they would be allowed to 
take home the mattress they were 
using at the cantonment site and 
became belligerent when they 
found out this was not the case. A 
communications strategy focused on 
managing expectations — explaining 
very clearly what the participants 
should expect from DDR and what is 
expected of them — is critical here, 
as is monitoring the process closely 
to identify problematic issues before 
they explode into riots. ••
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At right: Lejla Mavris discusses the need 
for fl exible DDR approaches that adapt 
to local realities. 
Part II: Reintegration 
— Best Practices 
and Lessons Identifi ed
11
One participant noted: “If reintegration 
fails, initial disarmament ‘success’ 
doesn’t really matter.” Any gains made 
in security and stability will likely be 
undone if marginalized individuals take 
up arms or turn to crime. ”
“
Reintegration is 
a complex and 
open-ended 
process, creating 
challenges for DDR 
implementers. 
For DDR to be 
sustainable, it must 
be connected to 
a wider process 
of economic 
reconstruction. 
Reintegration is the process by 
which ex-combatants acquire 
civilian status and gain sustainable 
employment and income. 
Reintegration is essentially a social 
and economic process with an 
open time-frame, primarily taking 
place in communities at the local 
level. It is part of the general 
development of a country and a 
national responsibility, and often 
necessitates long-term external 
assistance. (Secretary-General, 
note to the General Assembly, 
A/C.5/59/31, May 2005) 
Reintegration is the key to the ultimate 
success of DDR programs. As one 
participant noted, “If reintegration 
fails, initial disarmament ‘success’ 
doesn’t really matter.” Any gains made 
in security and stability with the initial 
disarmament and demobilization are 
likely to be undone as marginalized 
individuals take up arms again as rebels 
or turn to crime for their livelihood. 
Unfortunately, reintegration is also 
the most challenging component 
of DDR programs. Whereas 
initial disarmament efforts and 
demobilization are fairly limited in 
time and scope, reintegration is a 
complex and open-ended process. 
While the international community 
has experienced a number of 
short-run successes in stabilizing 
post-confl ict countries, longer-
term economic reconstruction 
more often has proven elusive. As 
one element within the broader 
strategy of economic recovery, 
the reintegration of individuals 
associated with armed forces must 
overcome daunting challenges. The 
next section details the challenges 
posed by reintegration, while the 
second highlights the response of 





Devastated Post-Conﬂ ict 
Economies 
Finding sustainable employment 
and income for ex-combatants is 
a challenge in devastated post-
confl ict economies which often 
lack infrastructure and feature high 
levels of unemployment, particularly 
among youth. If reintegration is 
to be sustainable, it needs to be 
connected to a wider process of 
economic reconstruction. 
Lack of Funding 
A lack of funding is one of the 
greatest obstacles to successful 
reintegration.8  While D&D programs 
rely on assessed peacekeeping funds, 
reintegration programs depend 
upon voluntary contributions that 
often never materialize. The timing 
also works against funding, as 
reintegration comes into play just 
when donors are getting fatigued. In 
the case of Liberia, 10,000 individuals 
in April 2008 were still awaiting 
reintegration programs four years 
after being demobilized. Ideally, most 
reintegration programs would run 
for three to fi ve years. In practice, 
funding delays are commonplace and 
program managers push hard to get 
funding for 18 months to three years. 
Funding can also be complicated 
by US and international regulations 
that prohibit providing funding to 
terrorist movements. This has proven 
to be a time-consuming, albeit not 
insurmountable, obstacle in the 
demobilization of the paramilitaries 
in Colombia (where it took two and 
a half years to resolve the matter), 
and it is also an issue with the Tamil 
Tigers in Sri Lanka. 
Formulaic Approaches to 
Economic Reintegration
Even in cases where the general 
economic context is more favorable 
and funding is available, reintegration 
programs have often failed because 
of their tendency to rely on formulaic 
approaches that ignore the realities 
of local labor markets and the 
preferences of ex-combatants. Too 
often, reintegration programs have 
assumed that ex-combatants will want 
to resettle in their village of origin 
and engage in traditional agricultural 
activities. As one participant noted, 
“We try to turn everyone into 
farmers.” Women at the workshop 
joked that DDR programs tried to 
make them all into basket weavers 
— ignoring economic realities (e.g., the 
inability of the market to absorb the 
fl ood of baskets produced by program 
graduates) and the preferences of the 
women (many of whom, having gained 
a range of experiences during wartime, 
did not regard basket making as a 
satisfying or valuable outlet for their 
skills). In Afghanistan, a reintegration 
plan to convert male soldiers to 
shepherds backfi red because women 
were responsible for tending livestock; 
not only did the plan fail to reintegrate 
the men, but it added to the already 
onerous burden on women.
In most of these cases of formulaic 
reintegration, a minimal level of 
cultural awareness and/or consultation 
with affected groups would have 
quickly revealed the folly of the 
proposed plans and permitted a change 
in course. In too many cases, however, 
valid complaints from program 
12
Ideally, most reintegration programs 
would run three to ﬁ ve years. In practice, 
funding delays are commonplace, 
leading to situations like Liberia, where 
10,000 individuals were still awaiting 
reintegration programs four years after 
being demobilized.”
“
At right: Fernando Calado, Mission in 
Colombia, International Organization for 
Migration, shares his perspective on DDR 
with Ambassador Jacques Paul Klein 
(Ret.), United Nations Missions in Bosnia, 
Herzegovina, and Liberia.
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At right: Dr. Douglas Porch, Naval 
Postgraduate School, discusses 
reintegration funding constraints with 
Sophie da Câmara. 
benefi ciaries have been ignored, 
particularly if they surface after the 
program is already in place. In the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo, in 
contrast, youth associated with armed 
forces rejected a program to provide 
them with agricultural training, 
insisting instead on construction-
related occupations. (A national 
agency devised the agricultural 
program without assessing employment 
opportunities in the area; in contrast, 
the youth were well aware of upcoming 
opportunities in construction through a 
government-sponsored local economic 
development initiative that had been 
widely promoted in the media.) 
Program implementers were able to 
adapt mid-stream, and most of the 
successful trainees were able to fi nd 
work building infrastructure for the 
municipality.9  Pilot programs that test 
the viability of different approaches 
are increasingly advocated and have 
the clear advantage of increasing 
receptiveness to feedback. 
In sum, DDR programs have tended 
to offer a limited (and often 
misguided) menu of vocational 
options for participants to choose 
from rather than looking at 
individuals, the market, and service/
employment providers to devise 
context-appropriate solutions. 
This tailored approach is not an 
easy one, but it is increasingly 
being adopted by the international 
community (as described in the 




As the Secretary General’s note to 
the General Assembly observes, 
reintegration takes place primarily in 
communities at the local level. Given 
this, the success of reintegration 
will depend upon the ability and 
willingness of local communities to 
accept former members of armed 
groups. In many cases, however, 
these communities may have 
been devastated by the war and 
have limited economic and human 
resources for rebuilding on their 
own, much less absorbing an infl ux 
of ex-combatants. 
In some cases, these communities 
may have suffered abuses by the 
rebels or blame rebel forces for 
abuses committed by government 
forces. Under such circumstances, 
tensions between ex-members 
of armed groups and receiving 
communities can run high. In the 
competition for scarce resources 
for reconstruction, communities 
may resent the aid packages given 
to individuals whom they blame for 
their hardships. (Even in communities 
which are sympathetic to the rebel 
groups, many are likely to question 
an inequitable distribution of 
resources between ex-combatants 
and communities.) Since the 
particular shape and severity of these 
tensions will vary depending upon a 
number of factors, it is important to 
consult with receiving communities 
to understand their attitudes toward, 
and capacities for, absorption of 
former members of armed groups. 
Lack of Programs 
Addressing Psycho-Social 
Dimensions of Reintegration
Workshop participants, many 
of whom advocate on behalf of 
groups traumatized by war (e.g., 
children, victims of sexual and 
gender-based violence) and/or 
work in war-affected communities, 
repeatedly emphasized the need 
to address the psycho-social 
dimensions of reintegration. At the 
same time, presentations at the 
workshop by DDR experts revealed 
relatively little emphasis on this in 
existing programs.10  Some services 
exist. Children are more likely to 
receive psychosocial counseling 
in interim care centers than adult 
combatants. Traditional “cleansing 
ceremonies” contribute to 
community reconciliation and may 
help some individuals reintegrate 
socially; however, there are many 
more DDR participants in need of 
individualized counseling. 
A major obstacle to the provision 
of psychosocial services is the lack 
of expertise in this issue. Personnel 
from the international community 
may have psychological training, but 
they usually lack the language skills 
and cultural understanding essential 
to effective counseling. On the 
14
CSRS events afford global practitioners the 
opportunity to broaden their professional 
networks and learn about the work of 
others. At right: Chinenye Dave-Odigie, 
Institute for Peace and Confl ict Resolution, 
discusses her organization’s work with 
Travis Adkins, Africare.
other hand, national personnel with 
an understanding of culture often 
lack training in psychology. Recent 
psychosocial programs in Colombia 
and Aceh represent exceptions 
but it is not clear that these are 
indicative of a broader trend toward 
incorporating psychosocial support 
and counseling in DDR programs.11 
Some DDR experts, well aware of past 
limitations of reintegration programs 
generally, argued that in practice the 
most one could hope for is helping 
former members of armed groups “get 
back on their feet” economically. 
Multiple Actors, Complex 
Coordination
While disarmament and 
demobilization tend to be highly 
centralized operations involving a 
limited number of specialists, social 
and economic reintegration of ex-
combatants requires the cooperation 
of a wide range of actors over a 
longer period of time. The challenge 
is to devise an integrated approach 
to synchronize the activities not 
only of the various actors involved 
in the different phases of the DDR 
process, but also the multiple players 
involved in development, including 
government agencies, international 
organizations, and the private sector.
Lack of National Capacity
Economic reintegration and broader 
economic reconstruction efforts 
depend heavily upon the policies and 
actions of the national government 
at all stages of the program. Since 
reintegration is an open-ended 
process that often needs to be 
carried out after peacekeeping forces 
have drawn down and international 
attention and assistance has faded, 
national capacity becomes even more 
important with the passage of time. 
For reintegration to be sustainable, 
DDR programs should contribute to 
building national-level capacity and 
mobilizing community-level resources.
Existence of Serious 
Information Gaps 
Effective reintegration requires a 
fi ne-grained understanding of the 
labor market and existing training 
capacities in different localities of 
the country. As this information is 
not readily available, it is essential 
that planning for reintegration begins 
before or during peace talks (and even 
be included on the peace agenda). 
Solutions
The workshop discussion of 
reintegration emphasized the 
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Course presenters discuss the upcoming 
sessions they will facilitate. 
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DDR experts face the daunting 
challenge of devising an integrated 
approach that synchronizes the activities 
of various actors involved in the different 
phases of DDR, as well as the myriad 
players involved in development work. ”
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importance of developing community-
based approaches that complement 
traditional programs benefi ting 
individuals formerly associated 
with armed forces. In keeping with 
this philosophy, the International 
Organization for Migration (IOM) 
explained its approach to economic 
reintegration which not only 
combines attention to individual and 
community needs, but also redresses 
many of the shortcomings with 
existing approaches outlined above. 
Community-Based Approaches
Workshop participants advocated 
community-based approaches to 
complement traditional programs 
that focus solely on the needs of 
ex-combatants. One way to do this 
in the short run is to employ ex-
combatants in quick-impact projects 
(e.g., labor-intensive infrastructure 
repair) that benefi t the community. 
While this win-win approach may 
not be sustainable, it can provide a 
much-needed boost to reconciliation 
in the immediate post-war period. 
Another approach is to address 
pressing needs shared by both ex-
combatants and the community, for 
example, creating mobile clinics to 
provide medical assistance.
Such approaches provide multiple 
benefi ts. They avoid creating the 
perception of rewarding those 
individuals who contributed to 
the confl ict and provide a “peace 
dividend” to communities that is 
essential for post-war reconstruction 
and reconciliation. They are not only 
cost-effective but generate public 
goods that are sorely needed in 
post-confl ict settings. Community-
based approaches have the additional 
benefi t of reaching individuals 
from marginalized groups (e.g., 
women and children) who were 
involved in the confl ict but who 
did not participate in the formal 
DDR program out of fear of being 
stigmatized or for some other reason. 
In addition to providing social services 
or economic reconstruction assistance 
to the community, community-
based approaches also require the 
participation of local groups. Since 
the community is the locus of both 
economic and social integration, 
community members and organizations 
must be consulted to determine 
both their willingness and ability to 
incorporate former members of armed 
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Major Rebecca Crispin, US Special 
Operations Command Europe, listens 
intently to Major Igor Talcan, Army of 
Moldova’s perspective on the need for 
community-based approaches to enrich 
traditional DDR programs.
groups. This information should be 
used not just to design sensitization 
campaigns targeting community 
perceptions but also to shape the 
content of reintegration programs. 
IOM’s Approach to 
Economic Reintegration
Drawing on their extensive experience 
with reintegration — not just of ex-
combatants but also of refugees and 
displaced persons — the International 
Organization for Migration has 
designed a four-pillar approach to 
economic reintegration that addresses 
a large number of the challenges 
outlined above. First, reintegration 
strategies should be based on 
information rather than assumptions. 
Second, individualized referral 
services replace the traditional, 
limited menu of vocational training 
which often does not meet the needs 
of the ex-combatants nor the labor 
market. Third, reintegration funds 
permit fl exibility in funding both 
individual and community-based 
initiatives. Fourth, the approach 
stresses the capacity building at the 
national level that is essential for 
sustainable reintegration. These four 
pillars of the Information, Counseling 
and Referral Services (ICRS) approach 
are discussed in more detail below:
n Assessment, Survey, and Profi ling 
Ideally, planning for reintegration 
should begin before or during the 
peace process with labor market 
surveys and analysis. Socioeconomic 
profi les of demobilizing combatants 
and other DDR benefi ciaries 
(identifying both their needs as well 
as existing capabilities) can then 
be matched to job opportunities 
and be used to determine the 
type of vocational training 
programs necessary. Geographical 
Information Systems mapping can 
graphically depict gaps between 
job seekers and job opportunities 
in areas of resettlement. A 
reintegration program that assumes 
combatants will want to return 
equally to all parts of the country 
and which distributes its offi ces 
accordingly may confront trouble 
if this is not the case. Caseload 
mapping that is updated over time 
helps track the program.
o Information, Counseling, 
and Referral Services
The program provides counseling 
for DDR benefi ciaries to ensure 
that reintegration solutions 
are based on informed decision 
making. Ensuring that participants 
have realistic expectations of 
job opportunities is essential to 
preventing disillusionment. Rather 
than replicating existing capabilities, 
the program reaches out to other 
international or government 
agencies, nongovernmental 
organizations, or the business 
community to provide training and 
job opportunities. While such a 
17
IOM has a four-pillar approach to 
economic integration that provides 
assessment, survey, and proﬁ ling 
services; information, counseling, and 
referral services; and small reintegration 
grants; while developing local capacity. ”
“
At far right: Nick Tomb, Center for 
Stabilization and Reconstruction Studies, 
reviews the workshop’s agenda with Kees 
Steenken (left) and Simon Yazgi (middle).
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referral service is labor-intensive, 
the integrated approach is key to a 
sustainable reintegration process. 
p Reintegration Fund
The IOM’s reintegration fund provides 
fl exible small grants which may be 
used by the community, individual 
DDR benefi ciaries, and even 
businesses (with the permission of the 
reintegrating individual). The funding 
of community initiatives facilitates 
community-based social and economic 
reintegration, making it a key part 
of broader community stabilization 
strategies. The availability of funds 
to individuals (e.g., start-up money 
for a micro-enterprise) contributes 
to the program’s overarching theme 
of providing individually tailored 
reintegration solutions that are 
presumably more viable than a limited 
menu of options that may fi t neither 
the needs of individuals nor the labor 
market. Finally, outreach to the 
business community through referral 
services (above) and the use of fl exible 
small grants for apprenticeships puts 
a new spin on community-based 
approaches, making them adaptable 
to the urban environments that are 
increasingly the resettlement locations 
of former members of armed groups. 
q Capacity Building
Whenever possible, IOM embeds 
its ICRS operation within the 
appropriate government ministry or 
department. The goal is to create 
a National Employee Referral 
Service that will contribute to 
sustainable economic development. 
Nongovernmental organizations that 
advocate for women and children, 
such as The Initiative for Inclusive 
Security and Save the Children, 
take a similar approach, working 
for the creation, inclusion in DDR 
processes, and strengthening of 
government ministries for women 
and the family. ••
Workshop participants heard an array of 
speakers representing global organizations 
integrally involved in DDR work. 
DDR practitioners 
seeking to develop 
a more inclusive 
approach need to 
consider the full 
range of groups 
affected by confl ict, 
such as female 
combatants, child 
soldiers, and support 
personnel. These 
groups are often 
invisible in the DDR 
process, but have 
great needs and 
are vulnerable to 
re-recruitment.
In the beginning, DDR programs 
evinced a military-oriented approach 
that stressed short-term security 
objectives: commanding offi cers 
provided a list of soldiers, who would 
be disarmed and demobilized and 
provided with economic assistance 
packages to prevent them from 
“spoiling” the peace. With time, 
however, the shortcomings of this 
approach became increasingly 
clear. Female combatants and child 
soldiers were highly visible members 
of fi ghting forces but tended to 
be invisible in the DDR process: 
They were underrepresented on 
commander-generated lists and, 
to the extent they participated 
in DDR, their special needs were 
often left unaddressed. At the same 
time, it became apparent that a 
narrow, combat-based view of armed 
groups neglected to provide for the 
demobilization and reintegration 
of the support personnel that in 
most armies tends to outnumber 
the fi ghting component. Women 
and children comprised the vast 
majority of these personnel and had 
their own experiences of the confl ict 
(such as repeated sexual abuse) that 
needed to be addressed. In addition, 
women and children dependents of 
combatants needed to be included in 
the DDR process if they were to be 
reintegrated into society. Finally, the 
growing consensus on the importance 
of reintegration (as opposed to 
short-term transitional aid) for 
ensuring stability led DDR specialists 
to focus on the special challenges of 
reintegrating youth. Boys and girls 
and young men and women between 
the ages of 15 and 24 are particularly 
vulnerable to re-recruitment 
given their limited skills and their 
marginalized position in society. The 
following section highlights some 
of the key dimensions of this more 
inclusive approach to DDR.
Women, Gender, 
and DDR
Women are increasingly involved 
in combat or are associated with 
armed groups and forces in other 
roles, work as community peace-
builders, and play essential roles in 
disarmament, demobilization and 
reintegration (DDR) processes. Yet 
they are almost never included in 
the planning or implementation of 
DDR. (IDDRS Framework, Women, 
Gender and DDR, Section 5.10) 
Developing a more inclusive approach 
to DDR requires practitioners to 
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Boys and girls and young men and 
women between the ages of 15 to 24 are 
particularly vulnerable to re-recruitment 
given their limited skills and their 
marginalized position in society.”
“
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embrace more groups as benefi ciaries 
as well as tend to key issues that 
had previously been neglected. 
This includes gender awareness in 
DDR programs and promoting the 
role of women as key shapers and 
implementers of DDR initiatives. In 
keeping with this, the UN’s Integrated 
DDR Standards (IDDRS) provides a 
chart of “gender-aware” and “female-
specifi c” initiatives at each phase of 
the DDR process: peace negotiations, 
assessment, planning and design, 
disarmament, demobilization, 
transitional support, assembly, 
cantonment, resettlement, social 
reintegration, economic reintegration, 
information and sensitization, and 
monitoring and evaluation.12
For the purposes of this report, 
“gender-aware” initiatives are broken 
down into two parts: avoiding gender 
bias and considering how DDR affects 
(and is affected by) gender roles. 
“Female-specifi c” interventions are 
also divided into two components: 
the involvement of women in the 
formulation, implementation, 
monitoring, and evaluation of DDR 
programs; and catering to the 
special roles, needs, preferences, 
and attributes of the women and 
girls who are benefi ciaries of DDR 
programs.13  Male and female gender 
advisers, as well as local women’s 
groups, should be included at each 
phase of the process.
n Avoiding Gender Bias
Many of the “gender-aware” measures 
listed in the IDDRS are efforts to avoid 
gender bias in DDR. For example, a 
labor market assessment should be 
carried out for both men and women; 
disarmament programs should ensure 
equal access to men and women; 
patterns of weapons possession for 
men and women should be evaluated; 
sex-disaggregated data should 
be collected with demobilization 
questionnaires; HIV counseling should 
be provided for men and women 
(though separate venues may be 
appropriate); support programs for 
victims of sexual assaults should 
target men and boys as well as women 
and girls; both men and women 
in receiving communities should 
be informed of the diffi culties ex-
combatants will face in reintegrating. 
o Gender Roles and DDR 
Even when they are not involved 
with armed forces and groups 
themselves, women are strongly 
affected by decisions made 
during the demobilization 
of men. Furthermore, it is 
impossible to tackle the problems 
of women’s political, social 
and economic marginalization 
or the high levels of violence 
against women in confl ict and 
post-confl ict zones without 
paying attention to how men’s 
experiences and expectations 
also shape gender relations. 
(IDDRS Framework, Women, 
Gender and DDR, Section 5.10)
Being gender aware also means 
addressing male gender roles and 
the impact that the demobilization 
and reintegration of men will have 
on women. For example, DDR 
publicity campaigns should take 
care not to reinforce images of 
violent masculinity. Demobilizing 
men should be encouraged to sign 
the agreements on how assistance 
from the transition package should 
be spent in the presence of their 
wives and dependents. Men should 
receive counseling about gender 
roles and how to fi nd non-violent 
means to deal with frustrations 
when expectations about those 
roles are not met. For example, 
an ex-combatant may struggle to 
reintegrate; the resulting frustration 
with the inability to provide for 
his family may result in domestic 
violence. Similarly, ex-combatants 
may expect their wives to conform 
to traditional gender roles, even 
though their roles and thinking 
may have changed while they 
tended to the household solo during 
wartime. In Rwanda, for example, 
men returned from war to fi nd that 
women’s roles had been transformed 
during their absence. Preparing a 
At right: Jacqueline O’Neill of The Initiative 
for Inclusive Security discusses the need 
for a gender-sensitive approach to DDR 
and highlights the key contributions 
women’s groups have made to improving 
the outcomes of DDR processes.  
demobilizing male combatant for 
these possibilities, and providing 
tools to cope with them, is essential 
for reducing the incidence of 
domestic violence, which often is a 
serious problem in the reintegration 
phase. In short, demobilizing male 
combatants need counseling not 
only on how their peacetime roles 
will differ from warfi ghting roles, 
but also how their roles at home 
may differ from what they were 
previously. Managing expectations — 
a task which is central to the success 
of DDR under circumstances of 
uncertainty and volatility — applies 
as well to gender relations.
p An Important Role for Women 
in Formulating, Implementing, 
and Monitoring DDR 
As US Ambassador to Angola 
immediately after the signing of the 
peace agreement, Don Steinberg 
insisted that women be involved 
as planners, implementers, and 
benefi ciaries for humanitarian and 
reconstruction assistance programs 
under the guidance, “Nothing about 
us without us.”
Gender-responsive DDR acknowledges 
that women should be consulted 
in the creation, execution, and 
oversight of DDR programs. Women 
— like all other benefi ciaries of DDR 
programs — need to be consulted if 
non-formulaic programs that meet 
the needs of their recipients are to 
be designed. Women’s experiences 
with and roles in confl ict often 
differ from those of men; their 
willingness and ability to participate 
in D&D programs are likely to be 
hindered in a number of ways that 
men’s participation is not; and 
reintegration is often hindered by 
the requirements of care-giving, 
restricted gender roles and rights, 
and other female-specifi c factors. 
(See the next section on “Women 
and girls as benefi ciaries of DDR” for 
a more complete discussion.) 
DDR processes are more likely to be 
gender responsive in their design 
if women are included from the 
earliest stages. Although women 
have typically been excluded from 
peace negotiations, their inclusion 
in the recent Darfur peace talks 
produced an (unimplemented) 
agreement in 2005 that was a model 
of gender sensitivity. Women’s 
groups should be included on 
national DDR commissions, including 
government ministries for women’s 
affairs and women’s peace-building 
networks. In addition, women play 
a key role in the implementation of 
DDR, as they are often in a better 
position than men to communicate 
with other women and understand 
their needs. For this reason, 
workshop participants stressed 
the need for more female soldiers 
in UN peacekeeping forces and 
particularly at cantonment sites. 
DDR teams should employ female 
interpreters to increase the chance 
that demobilizing women will freely 
communicate their needs and 
concerns during the demobilization 
process. Women who have chosen to 
self-reintegrate might be consulted 
to assess the incentives and/or 
obstacles to female demobilization. 
Women’s groups and female 
community leaders have also played 
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At right: Ambassador Jacques Paul Klein  
(Ret.) shares insights from his work at 
multiple United Nations missions. 
Nothing about us without us.
—  Don Steinberg, US Ambassador, Angola, speaking about the 
inclusion of women in the DDR process.
”“
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key roles in information campaigns 
to make women aware of DDR.
Since women make up at least 
half the adult population, and in 
post-confl ict situations may head 
up to 75 percent of all households, 
the involvement of women in DDR 
and SSR [security sector reform] 
is the most important factor in 
achieving effective and sustainable 
security. Furthermore, as the main 
caregivers in most cultures, women 
and girls shoulder more than their 
fair share of the burden for the 
social reintegration of male and 
female ex-combatants, especially 
the sick, traumatized, injured, HIV-
positive and under-aged. (IDDRS 
Framework, Women, Gender and 
DDR, Section 5.10)
More broadly, women’s inclusion at all 
stages of the DDR process is justifi ed 
by the important roles they play in 
post-confl ict societies as caregivers, 
community organizers mediators, and 
activists. Women possess a wealth 
of the context-specifi c information 
— not just about women but about 
local conditions — that is vital to the 
success of DDR and the transition to 
sustained peace. For example, they 
may have information on the number 
of combatants, the existence of 
arms caches, or the best locations 
for a cantonment site that is helpful 
for assessment and planning. They 
can help to raise awareness for 
disarmament programs, among 
both male and female members 
of the population, and contribute 
to monitoring the disarmament 
process within their communities. As 
key players within the community, 
they are particularly important for 
processes of reintegration. Women’s 
groups and female community leaders 
must be consulted to determine and 
shape community attitudes toward 
reintegration and to enumerate 
and mobilize the community 
resources available to facilitate both 
economic and social reintegration. 
Women’s groups also often play 
key roles in monitoring community 
developments and can assist in 
holding both traditional authorities 
and international organizations 
accountable for meeting the needs of 
the community. 
q Women and Girls as 
Benefi ciaries of DDR 
Women and girls play a variety of 
roles in armed confl ict — as fi ghters, 
supporters in non-combat roles 
(e.g., porters, spies, cooks) and as 
dependents of male combatants. 
As a result, advocates of a gender-
responsive DDR program have stressed 
the need for eligibility criteria that 
are not based on the possession of a 
weapon or the list of member names 
provided by commanders (which 
would not include support personnel 
At right: Rich Hoffman, Center for Civil-Military 
Relations; Alexandra Courtney, Offi ce of 
Confl ict Management and Mitigation, US 
Agency for International Development; and 
Dr. Douglas Porch. 
Women possess a wealth of context-
speciﬁ c information — not just about 
women but about local conditions — 
that is vital to the success of DDR 
and the transition to sustained peace. ”
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and might even exclude female 
combatants). Instead, a number of 
other screening mechanisms — such 
as questions about the group’s 
command structure or battles — are 
used to determine if women have 
knowledge that would establish their 
participation in the group. 
Even with these more inclusive 
eligibility criteria, women tend to 
under-enroll in DDR programs. One 
important reason may be a lack of 
information about these programs 
and the perception that possession 
of a weapon is a requirement for 
participation. Public relations 
campaigns to make women aware 
of these programs need to address 
the fact that, in many countries, 
women tend not to rely on radio and 
newspapers as their main sources of 
information. Campaigns using other 
women to spread the word in face-to-
face meetings have often proven to 
be a necessary complement to ads in 
more traditional media.
Women may also choose not to 
participate in DDR programs because 
of concerns about their safety in 
cantonment sites or the need to 
tend to children and households. In 
these cases, the use of mobile sites 
(or a network of offi ces distributed 
throughout the country) may boost 
rates of female participation. 
Introducing appropriate security 
measures at cantonment sites and 
programs that address women’s health 
needs (and advertising their availability 
to the target audience) should increase 
women’s willingness to participate. 
The employment of female workers 
at cantonment sites may expand the 
extent to which women’s needs are 
addressed and is likely to enhance 
women’s comfort levels. Provisions 
should be made for “war wives” to 
be processed separately from their 
male companions at cantonment sites, 
in an effort to allow them to make 
independent decisions about whether 
to reintegrate on their own or not.
 Reinsertion packages, designed to 
provide short-term material assistance 
before reintegration programs 
begin, may also need to be handled 
differently for women. Many women 
may prefer to receive their payments 
in installments, to avoid the security 
risk of carrying large sums of cash 
on their persons. To increase the 
likelihood that reinsertion monies 
provided to men will actually go the 
care of their families, the UN’s IDDRS 
suggests some innovative strategies, 
including having ex-combatants 
receive information about and sign for 
dependent benefi ts in the presence of 
their families. 
Finally, economic and social 
reintegration poses key challenges 
for women. Economically, traditional 
gender roles and limited rights for 
women, especially in terms of land 
ownership and access to capital, pose 
hurdles to reintegration not present 
for men. Women’s role as caregivers 
may block their participation 
in vocational training and other 
reintegration programs; DDR programs 
should have provisions for child care 
or other measures that would allow 
increased women’s participation. At 
the same time, reintegration funds 
for house construction or to start up a 
microenterprise might be appropriate 
responses to women’s need to work 
out of the home. 
Socially, women who have been 
traumatized by sexual or gender-
based violence may have a hard time 
readjusting. They may be rejected by 
communities, especially if they have 
children fathered by the “enemy,” or 
may even need individual counseling 
to accept children born of rape. 
Other women, for whom confl ict 
was more a period of empowerment 
than denigration, may face different 
challenges in reintegrating into a 
society that expects them to conform 
to traditional gender roles. For both 
sets of women, support groups made 
up of women formerly in armed groups 
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At right: Jebbeh Forster, UN Development 
Fund for Women, offers her views on how 
to ensure the fair inclusion of women in 
DDR programs. 
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may be particularly important outlets 
for social reintegration. These groups 
have the added advantage of reaching 
women who may not have gone 
through the formal DDR process.
Children and Youth 
Associated with 
Armed Forces 
There is a growing international 
consensus that the forced or 
compulsory recruitment of children 
— girls and boys under the age of 
18 — and their use in hostilities 
by both armed forces and armed 
groups is illegal and one of the 
worst forms of child labour. The 
recruitment and use of children 
under 15 is a war crime. (IDDRS)  
The recruitment of children is illegal 
and efforts to prevent this and to 
demobilize child soldiers must be 
actively carried out at all times. Such 
efforts should occur before, during, 
and after peace talks and should not 
be contingent upon the progress of 
peace talks or the adult DDR program. 
While this ongoing effort requires a 
constant presence of child advocacy 
groups on the ground, their vigilance 
should be increased in the lead-up 
to a peace treaty. During this time 
period, commanders of armed groups, 
fearing International Criminal Justice 
Court charges for the use of child 
soldiers, are likely to release children 
in the bush (or worse) prior to formal 
demobilization; an early presence 
of international organizations could 
preempt violent measures and respond 
to the outfl ow of child soldiers.
Many features of the DDR process must 
be modifi ed to take into account the 
special needs and circumstances of 
children associated with armed forces. 
First, the possession of weapons or 
knowledge of how to operate weapons 
should not be criteria for children’s 
participation in the process. As with 
the suggested eligibility criteria for 
women, this acknowledges the fact 
that many children serve support 
roles and are not actual combatants. 
Second, it is widely agreed that 
children should not receive cash 
payments during the demobilization 
phase.14 Commanders are in a position 
to manipulate the process, either 
taking the cash payment from the 
children or sending their own young 
relatives to participate in the program 
in place of child soldiers. 
Third, every effort should be made to 
minimize children’s stay in cantonment 
sites to 48 hours or less on their way 
to interim care centers. While at 
the sites, child soldiers should be 
physically separated from adults and 
their security guaranteed. (Children 
of members of the armed forces, on 
the other hand, should remain with 
their families at the cantonment sites.) 
Girls who are “war wives” should be 
separated from the men and given a 
choice of resettling on their own or 
with a companion. 
Fourth, since children cannot be 
legally mobilized, they do not 
go through the same symbolic 
demobilization process as adults. 
Rather, after being “released” from 
armed groups, children are placed 
in interim care centers where they 
undergo a process of rehabilitation 
including psychosocial interventions 
designed to facilitate “crossing 
the bridge” from their former lives 
to a new one.15  While there, the 
groundwork is laid for the longer-
term process of reintegration. In 
some cases, family tracing allows 
for children to be reunited with 
their families. 
In many cases, children face special 
challenges resuming “normal” lives 
and integrating into communities. 
In some cases, children may have 
become vulnerable to recruitment 
because they ran away from abusive 
homes and may not want to return 
there. In other cases, children have 
been abducted by an armed group 
and forced to watch or participate 
in atrocities against their own 
At right: Deborah Barry, Save the Children, 
discusses the challenges of reintegrating 
child soldiers into a post-confl ict society. 
families and communities as a 
way to prevent them from being 
able to desert and return home. 
Perhaps even more so than for other 
combatants, successful reintegration 
for children depends upon an on-
going dialogue with the receiving 
community to understand their 
attitudes toward returning children. 
Finally, while reintegration for adults 
focuses on vocational training, 
most child soldiers opt to resume 
their education. Those who are 
not interested in this option — as 
is more often the case with older 
boys and girl mothers — should 
be offered alternative ways to 
participate as citizens. Programs 
teaching life skills and vocational 
skills would be appropriate for these 
groups; incorporating the teaching 
of some of these skills (for example, 
parenting skills) into the regular 
school curriculum would benefi t child 
soldiers who have chosen the more 
traditional reintegration route as well 
as the broader population of children 
affected by war. 
Sustainable reintegration also requires 
specifi c attention to capacity building; 
child advocacy groups often work 
to create or strengthen government 
ministries dealing with the welfare of 
the family and/or children. 
As with other reintegration programs, 
community-based approaches are 
strongly advocated to complement 
the services provided on an individual 
case basis to former child soldiers. 
Broad-based community programs 
address the overlapping needs of 
child soldiers and children affected 
by confl ict; help target the root 
causes of child recruitment; and 
reduce the resentment produced 
by targeted assistance to child 
soldiers. In addition, community-
based approaches help reach child 
soldiers who have, by choice or 
circumstance, not enrolled in the 
DDR process. There are a wide range 
of reasons that child soldiers may 
remain “invisible” during the DDR 
process. These rationales include 
the wish to avoid the stigma of being 
associated with an armed group; the 
trauma of having been a victim of 
sexual violence; or parental concerns 
over how participation in DDR will 
affect their child’s future work and 
marriage eligibility. 
Youth
For a variety of reasons, DDR 
programs need to tailor socio-
economic reintegration strategies 
to the special needs of young ex-
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The challenge now is for agencies to respect 
the right of children to remain ‘invisible’ 
by reﬁ ning their delivery of broad-based 
community programmes, while continuing to 
ensure that service delivery and advocacy 
continue to meet the needs of individual 
cases without making it widely known.
-- Save the Children ”
“
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Pictured from left to right: Alexandra 
Courtney and Lyla Bashan, Offi ce for 
the Coordinator of Reconstruction and 
Stabilization, US Department of State.
combatants and youth in general 
(defi ned by the United Nations as 
individuals between 15 and 24 years 
of age).16  In many countries, this 
age group tends to be the most 
vulnerable to violence, disease (e.g., 
HIV/AIDS, other sexually transmitted 
diseases, substance abuse), and 
marginalization. Ex-combatants are 
particularly vulnerable since they 
spent their formative years in armed 
groups, where they not only missed 
out on “normal” educational and 
socialization experiences but also are 
likely to have engaged in drug use, 
sexual activity, and violent behavior 
that puts them at risk. In post-confl ict 
societies, youth pose a high security 
risk as the vast majority of those 
re-recruited fall between the ages 
of 15 and 30. Despite stereotypes of 
female docility, the vulnerability to 
re-recruitment is not limited to young 
men; for this reason, reintegration 
programs targeting the specifi c needs 
of young women are necessary as well.
The economic reintegration of young 
ex-combatants is often ill-served 
by the menu of programs offered 
to children and adults. While ex-
combatants under 18 are children 
according to international legal 
norms, they may have assumed 
roles as parents and caregivers that 
render inadequate the reintegration 
programs designed for children and 
youth associated with armed forces. 
One participant noted, for example, 
that the policy of no cash payments 
to children is simply not tenable in 
Uganda where a signifi cant number of 
15- to 18-year-old combatants have 
families to support. At the same 
time, adult reintegration programs 
focus on vocational training that 
ignores the young ex-combatants’ 
need for remedial education. The 
high rates of unemployment for 
young people and child labor laws 
limiting work for those under the 
age of 18 also pose special challenges 
for the economic reintegration of 
young ex-combatants.
As important as economic integration 
is the social reintegration of young ex-
combatants. A series of factors make 
this a much more diffi cult process for 
younger combatants than for their 
older counterparts. Whereas combat-
weary older combatants often welcome 
the return to their families and a 
“normal life,” many young combatants 
neither have a “normal life” as a 
reference point nor do they possess the 
skills necessary for such a life. They 
may need to learn impulse control 
for the fi rst time and must adjust 
to dealing with authority and older 
generations. The disparity between 
the power and status they had as 
gun-wielding combatants and their 
relatively marginalized position in post-
confl ict society is often great. Providing 
support structures and opportunities 
to exercise leadership within their 
community, for example in sports 
clubs or other local organizations, may 
provide a useful antidote. 
Finally, all marginalized youth, and 
not just ex-combatants, are at high 
risk of recruitment into armed or 
criminal groups; ex-combatant and 
civilian youth needs can be met 
simultaneously through community-
based reintegration programs. ••
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Whereas combat-weary older combatants 
often welcome the return to their families 
and a ‘normal life,’ many young 
combatants neither have a ‘normal life’ as 
a reference point nor do they possess the 
skills necessary for such a life.”
“
At right: Kees Steenken, Swedish National 
Defence College.
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To contribute to a 
sustainable peace, 
DDR programs must 
consider the needs of 
all affected groups and 
adopt best practices to 
address realities on the 
ground. Meanwhile, 
reintegration must be 
tailored to local needs 
and opportunities.
At right: A workshop participant and 
Lieutenant Colonel Denis Sevaistre Army 
of France, NATO School, North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization talk about how to 
tailor reintegration approaches to meet 
local needs.
In recent years, veterans of 
DDR processes have worked 
hard to identify lessons learned 
from their past experiences and 
highlight best practices. It is 
now widely accepted that if DDR 
programs are to contribute to 
a sustainable peace, they must 
be attentive to the needs of all 
involved groups, including women, 
children and youth. The relatively 
straightforward processes of 
disarmament and demobilization 
are complicated by the volatility 
and uncertainty that dominates 
in the early stages of the peace 
process. The need to adapt best 
practices to the realities on the 
ground is widely asserted but is 
made diffi cult by the international 
community’s tendency to bring 
in outside experts and to treat 
disarmament and demobilization 
as a logistical challenge that 
can be resolved with top-down 
planning processes. In contrast, 
consultation with women’s and 
community groups, during the early 
stage of the process, has proven 
crucial to introducing much needed 
“fl exibility” into DDR prescriptions.
Similarly, DDR experts now 
acknowledge that women’s groups 
and other stakeholders at both the 
community and national level need 
to be mobilized and incorporated 
into the process if reintegration is 
to be sustainable. Reintegration 
programs for demobilizing individuals 
must be grounded in information 
and consultation and tailored to 
particular needs and opportunities; 
in contrast formulaic approaches that 
offer a limited menu of vocational 
training have failed repeatedly. The 
tailored approach to reintegration 
is based on outreach to the variety 
of actors (governmental, national, 
community-based, international, 
business) necessary for sustainable 
economic reintegration, seeking both 
to build on existing capacity and to 
build capacity. Finally, community-
based programs are essential for 
creating communities both willing 
and able to absorb ex-combatants 
and able to participate in a broader 
process of economic reconstruction in 
a post-confl ict setting. 
Conclusion
Reintegration programs for demobilizing 
individuals must be grounded in 
information and consultation and 
tailored to local needs; in contrast, 
formulaic approaches that offer a 
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Standards refl ect two years 
of work in headquarters 
and the fi eld by the United 
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component of DDR” (IDDRS 
8.3.2). Only two paragraphs 
are devoted to this in the 
700+ page IDDRS. 
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demobilization of 
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(approximately $15,000 
versus an average of $1000 
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likely to be replicated in 
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and DDR in the full IDDRS 
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sending their own children 
and excluded the real child 
soldiers. See Refugees 
International, “Liberia: 
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